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A 1952 SURVEY OF BASIC OIL AND GAS LAW
Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr.*
I
The Physical Nature of Oil and Gas and the Effect
Thereof upon Oil and Gas Law.
S OME formations or strata beneath the earth's surface are
sufficiently porous to contain oil and gas. When a well is
drilled into such a stratum, it may prove to be completely devoid
of either substance; it may, however, contain large quantities of
oil or gas, or both. The outer boundaries of the reservoir created
by such a mineral-bearing stratum are, generally speaking, fixed
by the places at which the stratum terminates or ceases to hold oil
or gas.
Let us assume for present purposes the existence of a stratum
holding both oil and gas, and that the reservoir thus formed
underlies the tracts of several owners, A, B, and C.
Until the reservoir is pierced, the oil and gas remain stationary
in the porous formation; however, when a well pierces the stratum,
the oil and gas move from all sides toward the opening. Thus,
when A drills a well, he can produce from it not only the oil and
gas which originally underlay his land but also can drain oil and
gas from the land of B and C. This migratory factor, which at
once distinguishes oil and gas from solid minerals, has been and
is the most important single factor in the development of oil and
gas law. It raises problems that cross-section this entire field of
*Professor of Law, Soulvrni M l,,disi University; mether of the Texas State Bar.
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law. For example, does B own the oil and gas underlying his
land? If A's well produces oil from under B's tract, who is entitled
to such oil? Can there be valid governmental control over how
much oil and gas can be produced; how it can be produced; how
the oil and gas shall be divided among A, B, and C? Can A
transfer his interest, if any, in the minerals? Is such interest one
in realty or one in personalty?
Frequently, the key to the solution of these and other prob
can be found in the fact that, because of the migratory nature of
oil and gas, operations upon one tract usually have a direct effect
upon the oil and gas underlying other tracts in the same reservoir.
II
Theories as to the Interest or Title Which can be
Acquired in Oil and Gas.
It is elementary that at common law the landowner with a fee
simple title owns to the center of the earth. As a corollary, except
in Louisiana,1 which applies civil law, courts have found no diffi-
culty in holding that such an owner owns the solid minerals under-
lying his tract. As to oil and gas, however, there has been
confusion. The early cases assumed that it was necessary to hold
that the landowner owns oil and gas produced from a well bot-
tomed on his tract even though the oil and gas were drained from
under another's tract. The reason usually given was that because
of the impossibility of determining the tracts drained, and the
extent of drainage, any other rule would be unworkable. This rule
that one owner can rightfully drain oil and gas from other tracts,
and acquire title to the oil and gas so drained, adopted in the
various states with remarkable consistency, became known as the
rule of capture. The next problem was to reconcile a rule which
I Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923).
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would allow A to appropriate oil and gas from under B's land
with the rule that each owner owns to the center of the earth.'
Obviously, this rule precluded a holding that the owners of the
tracts constituting the reservoir owned the substances therein as
tenants in common.
One possible solution was to hold that because of the migratory
nature of oil and gas, they are owned by no one until captured.
True, each landowner has an exclusive right to drill wells on his
land and to capture oil and gas from the reservoir. This right is an
interest in the nature of an easement or profit a prendre, and can
be sold or transferred in the same manner as can any other prop-
erty interest. This rule that no one can own the oil and gas until
capture, but that the right to capture them is a property right which
can be owned, is usually referred to as the qualified ownership
doctrine.8
Another solution was to hold that each owner owned the oil and
gas beneath his land, but would lose ownership if and when they
migrated beyond his borders. This rule became known as the doc.
trine of absolute ownership.4
Frequently there will be conflicting statements within a single
jurisdiction, with the result that it cannot be definitely classified as
committed to either theory.' In effect, a given state may apply the
qualified ownership rule for some purposes and the absolute
ownership rule for others.
When and the extent to which the theory of ownership is important
will be considered in connection with the various matters yet to
be discussed.
2 This matter is fully discussed in I SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (Perm.
ed. 1938) § 62.
a The case most frequently cited in support of this proposition is Ohio Co. v. State
of Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900).
4 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290, 29
A. L. R. 566 (1923).




Correlative Rights and Duties as Among the Owners
of the Reservoir.
A, B, and C own in severalty three tracts of land which include
an oil and gas reservoir. As previously stated, if A taps the reser-
voir with a well on his tract, this will have a direct effect upon
the oil and gas underlying the tracts of B and C. This at once
poses two problems: (1) Does A owe any duties to B and C as to
transactions involving the common reservoir? (2) May such duties
validly be imposed by statute or regulation?
Numerous articles and decisions could be cited arguing these
question pro and con, particularly with reference to the impor-
tance to be attached to the theory of ownership applied in the state
in question. These discussions are of historical interest only. While
some recent decisions have referred to the theory of ownership
as a factor,6 all jurisdictions which have considered the problems
now recognize that there are some correlative rights and duties
existent under common law, and that reasonable additional ones
can validly be imposed by legislation.'
The rights and-duties which will be recognized aside from those
imposed by legislation may well vary as the petroleum industry
grows and changes. It seems clear that once the duty is established,
whether by common law or statute, a breach thereof would consti-
tute a tort and could form the basis of a cause of action in favor
of any one injured thereby.8 The discussion immediately following
deals with the more important rights and duties recognized at
present.
11 Thus, in Eliff v. Texon I)rilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 579, 580, 210 S. W. 2d 558, 560
(1948) the court said: "'We do not regard as authoritative the three decisions by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana ... because in that state only (Ijualified ownership of oil
and gas is recognized....
7 Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. "S. 8, 78 A. L. R. 826 (1931)
Thompson v. Consolidated (;as Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937); Manufacturers'
Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Cas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N. E. 912, 50 L. R. A. 768 (1900).
8 Peterson v. Graycc Oil Co., 37 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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(a) Duty to plug abandoned wells.
A has a producing well on his tract. It ceases to produce in
amounts sufficient for A to realize a profit, and so A abandons it.
Oil and gas from under the lands of B and C continue to migrate
to and escape from A's abandoned well. Their complaint is met by
A's contention that under the law of capture, he is entitled to
produce all he desires, and it is none of B's and C's business
whether the oil and gas are actually used or are allowed to escape
into the air. Probably this contention of A would be overruled
even in the absence of legislation. This is unimportant now because
all producing states have express requirements as to plugging.9
(b) Duty not to use unusual means to capture.
The rule of capture has been construed to authorize capture
only by customary or usual means." This restriction is based on
reasoning to the effect that each owner should be given a reason-
able opportunity to capture his fair share of the oil and gas in the
reservoir, which opportunity would be impaired if unusual means
were used. This seems illogical where each owner has an equal
opportunity to use unusual means. A sounder ground would be
to measure the duty by the standard next discussed, i.e., the duty
which each owes to the others not to unreasonably damage the
common reservoir.
What constitutes usual and unusual means would depend largely
upon custom in the industry at the time of the complained of
action. This problem is usually solved by legislation or regula-
tion thereunder as to the methods of capture.
(c) Duty not to unreasonably injure the reservoir.
It is clear that A owes a duty to B and C not to unreasonably
injure the reservoir by reducing its capacity to produce. Such
injury may occur through physical damage to the reservoir. Thus,
to increase porosity and permeability of a possibly productive
structure, A might and frequentily would causc an expiosion in
1'ilPigging requirements are listed by states in 1 SUMMERS,Ti, LAW 0()11 OI AND (;AS
(Pern. ed. 1938) § 72.
", I',:tirson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S. W. 2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931 I.
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the well. This is customarily referred to as "shooting the well."
This explosion might cause damage to the structure itself, or it
might result in the intrusion of salt water from another structure.
It is clear that A owes a duty not to willfully damage the reser-
voir, and, further, that A owes a duty not to negligently cause
such damage." Possibly some states would apply absolute liability
even in the absence of negligence or some other recognized tort.
Oklahoma applies absolute liability in many situations, but re-
fused to do so as to this type of damage. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held applicable the rule that when both plaintiff and defend-
ant are engaged in an inherently dangerous transaction, absolute
liability will not be applied.1"
Of course, sometimes a duty will be breached aside from any
question of correlative rights and duties. Thus, if A's well physi-
cally intrudes into the subsurface of B's land, this would be a
trespass." The same rule would seem applicable if a subsurface
explosion causes substances to move without interruption into
another's tract."
Another way in which the reservoir may become unnecessarily
damaged is by inefficient production methods. Only one reported
case seems to have discussed this matter, and it held in effect that
as long as the method was not in violation of a valid law, use of
an inefficient method would not breach any duty."
(d) Duty not to waste gas.
11 Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas and Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 298 S. W. 554
(Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
12 Larkins v. Watchorn, 198 Okla. 12, 174 P. 2d 589 (1946).
13 Alphonzo & Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P. 2d 167
(1938).
14 This possibility was mentioned but not passed upon in Comanche Duke Oil Co.
v. Texas & Pac. Coal and Oil Co., 298 S. W. 554 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). Possibly
a vibration would be held a trespass, although such a contention as to an above-sur-
face explosion was rejected in Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rainwater, 140
S. W. 2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). A similar result was reached in Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S. W. 2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). See Comment, 3 South.
western L. J. 458 (1949).
1
- Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 299, 206 P. 2d 944
(1949). All producing states have laws as to methods of production, varying from
state to state.
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Of course, if the rule of capture were literally applied, A would
have a right willfully to waste gas. But the decisions have qualified
this rule to the extent that there are now instances in which A owes
a duty to B and C not to cause or allow waste.
First, suppose the waste is willful? Here the answer may turn
upon whether the court considers that the waste is for a justifiable
purpose. In an early Pennsylvania case'6 B had a market for his
gas and A did not. A vented the gas from his well for the admitted
purpose of forcing B to share his market. The supreme court,
reversing an intermediate court, held that this was a legitimate
use of the rule of capture.
In a Kentucky case A and B were competitors. A purchased
interests in the gas fields from which B was producing, and began
wasting gas for the purpose of putting B out of business. The
court held that waste for such a purpose constituted a breach of
duty. 17
Next, suppose that the waste itself is neither willful nor unlaw-
ful, but that it results from a well blowout, which blowout was
caused by negligence. If the negligence amounts to gross negli-
gence, Louisiana has recognized the resulting waste as a proper
basis for recovery.s Even when the blowout is caused by common
negligence, Texas treats the loss of oil and gas as a basis for re-
covery.'9
The statement was made that the theory of ownership is unim-
portant in defining correlative rights and duties. Distinguish this
problem from the one of determining the measure of damages in
the event a duty is breached. In a qualified ownership state, the
usual measure of the difference in value before and after the loss
would seem applicable. There could be no conversion, or taking
1; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714 (1893).
17 Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentuncky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368 (1903)
id., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S. W. 374 (1908).
11 McCoy v. Arkansas Nal. Gas. Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936).
1 Elliff v. Texon Drilling C.. 146 Tx. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 558 (1948), later proceed-
ings, 216 S. W. 2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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of another's property, when we start with the premise that no one
had title until capture.
In states applying the absolute ownership theory, if the rule of
capture is held inapplicable, the courts could logically hold that
damages should be measured by the actual value of the substances
which escape. It is submitted that such a measure is unfair in that
it fails to take into account several important factors, including,
among others, the fact that the market price is affected to a sub-
stantial degree by governmental regulations restricting production,
whereas the measure of damages in question would allow an
adjoining landowner to recover for oil or gas produced far in
excess of that which could legally be produced from a well under
control. Further, A is not actually appropriating the oil and gas-
they are escaping into the air."0 Perhaps the most important objec-
tion to this measure is that it subjects any person drilling for oil or
gas to a potential liability of millions of dollars. If it is suggested
that the requirement of negligence justifies this result, the answer
is that there are and will be many border-line cases as to common
negligence.
IV
Governmental Regulation of Exploration for and
Production of Oil and Gas.
It is now settled that there is no constitutional objection to rea-
sonable regulation by states of exploration for and production of
oil and gas. As in the case of correlative rights, much could be
and has been written on this question, particularly with reference
to the theory of ownership applied in a given state. The rule, how-
ever, is now too well established to justify such a discussion.
20 Texas, while perhaps not irrevocably committed, has indicated that a prper
measure is one based on the market value of the substances which escaped. Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., cited in note 19. For further discussions of the problem, see Walker,
Important Oil and Gas Decisions, 11 Tex. B. J. 480 (1948); Masterson, The Legal
Position of the Drilling Contractor in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION FIRST ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAXATION (1949) 183, 212 et seq.
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We still have the important primary problem of whether a given
statutory or regulatory provision is reasonable and the secondary
procedural problem of how this question can be put in issue.
As to the primary problem, it is now settled that any provision
which bears a reasonable relationship either to conservation of
these natural resources or to the adjustment of correlative rights
of the owners thereof, or to both, is valid." As long as there is no
discrimination, an order absolutely prohibiting production could
possibly bear a reasonable relationship to conservation and hence
constitute a valid order.2 When feasible, however, the order to
be reasonable would usually have to afford each owner a fair
opportunity to produce from the common pool an amount of oil or
gas approximating that which underlay his.land prior to regula-
tion, or, alternatively, to receive payment based upon such an
amount. 3
(a) Methods of regulation.
(1) Regulation as to location of wells.
In the absence of regulation, A, B, and C each has an incentive
to drill as near his boundary line as possible, in order to drain oil
and gas from under his neighbor's land. Each also has an incentive
to drill as many wells as possible in order to stay even or ahead
in the race to capture the oil and gas from the reservoir. This
results in inefficient recovery methods and in numerous unneces-
21 Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62 (1948) ; Henderson v.
Thompson, 300 U. S. 258 (1937) ; Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300
U. S. 55 (1937). In the first cited case the rule is discussed in a dissenting opinion,
the majority being of the opinion that the order in question was not final and hence
not appealable. The reasoning in both opinions, however, leaves no doubt that the dis-
senting opinion reflects the Court's view on the merits.
2" Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied. 2114 11. S. 634 (1931).
2 1 Sev cases cited supra note 21 and in addition the following: Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 86 A. L. R. 403 (1932) ; Marrs v. Rail-
road Commission. 142 Tex. 294, 177 S. W. 2d 941 (1944). Several possible factors
which hav been mentioned but not fully developed by the authorities are as to the
importance if any. of greater production from one of the tracts prior to regulation, or
prior to attack upon a regulation, and as to the importance, if any, of the fact that
becaust of greater porosity or some other physical condition, more can be produced
from one tract than from another, although originally equal amounts of oil were
trapped under each tract.
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sary wells. It is a recognized scientific fact that a reservoir can be
most efficiently and economically drained when the wells are
drilled under a uniform spacing pattern. The difficulty is to recon,
cile such a program with the divergent property interests usually
existent in various tracts in the same field or reservoir. Thus, in a
given field it might be that an advisable spacing pattern would y'
one well located in the center of each ten acres. But suppose A
owns this center acre, while B owns 5 adjoining acres and C the
other four. Under the law of capture, A will receive all of the pro-
duction. Obviously such a result would be contrary to the rule that
each owner must be given a reasonable opportunity to recover the
oil and gas originally underlying his tract. Thus, unless the regu-
lation forces A to share production from his tract with B and C,
it would usually be unreasonable. The validity of a regulation
forcing such sharing will be discussed presently. It is sufficient at
this point to note that while regulation through well-spacing is
helpful, it is usually not a satisfactory solution of the problem of
efficient and economical production.
The Texas decisions furnish an interesting picture of the difficul-
ties involved where there is divergent ownership, and also some
possible partial solutions thereof.
In Texas the Railroad Commission. under enabling legislation,
in 1919, adopted Rule 37, which provides in effect that no well
shall be drilled contrary to the prescribed pattern in a given field
unless such a well is necessary to prevent waste or to avoid con-
fiscation. The rule further provides that where confiscation is the
ground, a permit will not be granted if the tract as to which an
exception is necessary was subdivided from a tract as to which an
exception would not be necessary, sihsequent to oil and gas activity
in the vicinity in question. In other words, an owner desiring an
additional well could not sultdivide a portion of his tract for the
purpose of securing a permit for such well.24
24 Rule 37 is set forth and discossed at length in Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refin-
ing Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S. W. 2d 73 (1939). See also Brown v. lhjmble Oil and
Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S. W. 2d 935, 87 S. W. 2d 1069 99 A. L. R. 1107, 101
A. L. R. 1393 (1935).
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In applying this rule the Commission grants a permit for at
least one well to each tract too small to conform to the spacing
pattern, when such tract was subdivided in good faith and prior to
oil and gas activity in the vicinity. In addition, and regardless of
the time of subdivision, the Commission grants permits for as
nany additional wells as are necessary to prevent waste. In this
connection, such a permit will not be granted unless there are
physical differences between the tract as to which the permit is
sought and other tracts in the field."5
(2) Proration.
Let us assume that A, B, and C each has a well upon his tract.
The extent to which each will be allowed to produce can be fixed
by reasonable regulation. Here again the test is whether the regu-
lation affords each owner a reasonable opportunity to recover the
oil and gas underlying his tract prior to regulation. A state can
validly prohibit completely a use for a wasteful purpose. 6 Fur-
ther, a state can validly determine market demand on a statewide
basis, and then allocate allowable production among the various
fields in the state. This is held to be reasonable on the ground that
production beyond market demand would inevitably result in
wasteful practices.27 Proration on a state-wide basis involves deter.
mination of the state allowable and then a distribution of this
allowable among the various fields in a state. Thus, conservation
of resources is the primary factor; a secondary factor is the adjust-
ment of correlative rights of the owners in a given field in deter-
mining the allowable to be granted to each. It is clear that the fact
that A has a market while B does not, does not of itself give A a
right to a higher allowable. However, if there is actually no drain-
age from B's well to A's well, an order which in effect forces A to
2', See authorities cited in note 24.
- Henderson v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258 (1937).
21 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 86 A. L. R.
403 (1932) ; see Hardwicke, Market Demand as a Factor in the Con.servation of Oil in




share his market with B might be invalid as without reasonable
basis."
(3) Pooling or unitization.
Let us again assume that A, B, and C are the owners of separate
tracts which together constitute part of an oil or gas reservoir, A's
tract including one acre, B's five acres, and C's four acres. It is
determined scientifically that but one well should be drilled to
drain this ten-acre portion of the field and that it should be drilled
on A's one acre. If the law of capture is applied, however, A will
receive the benefit of oil or gas drained from under the land of B
and C. To avoid such an unfair result, it will be necessary to allow
B and C to drill wells, which actually are unnecessary, or to nullify
the law of capture, and permit B and C to share in production
from A's tract. This latter method is referred to as forced pooling
or unitization. It is now settled that there is no constitutional objec-
tion to a state regulation which unitizes the interests of owners in
a given field, provided always that such regulation is reasonable.
Reasonableness vel non again will depend upon whether the
amounts which each owner will receive bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the amount of oil and gas underlying each tract prior to
regulation. 9
Of course, forced pooling cannot apply unless there is a valid
state law authorizing such action. Some states, including Okla-
homa and Louisiana, have such laws. Others do not. In Texas the
28 In Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 69, 70 (1937),
the Court said: "But, obviously, the proration orders would not be valid if shown to
bear no reasonable relation either to the prevention of waste, or the protection of
correlative rights or if shown to be otherwise arbitrary." See, also, Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commnission, note 27; Railroad Commission v. Continental Oil Co.,
157 S. W. 2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. rel. w.o.m.
29 Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U; S. 222 (1943) ; Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and
Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155.77 P. 2d 83 (1938), app. dism'd, 305 U. S. 376 (1939). The sim-
plest formula for unitizing is to take the total acreage in a unit as a denominator and the
acreage contributed by each owner as a numerator. Thus, in the example posed, A
would receive 1/10 of the production payable to the landowners, B would receive 5/10
thereof and C, 4/10. Sometimes such a formula would not do justice because of dif-
ferent geological conditions in the tracts involved. Thus, A's tract might have a more
permeable sand, or a thicker sand, or a higher pressure. In these instances, formulas
art worked out which include such other factors.
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law expressly prohibits the Railroad Commission from enforcing
pooling. Even where authorized, the power is infrequently used,
because this method has not as yet found much popularity among
mineral owners. Whenever possible, resort to such power is
avoided by securing voluntary unitization agreements.3"
(4) Direct sharing.
Throughout the years there has been constant controversy be.
tween the owners with a market and those without. Forced sharing
has resulted indirectly through proration, and directly through
pooling. In the latter instance the justification usually given is that
such sharing avoids unnecessary wells. Suppose, however, that A
and B each has a well. A has a market and B has not. Absent regu-
lation, B could give A an incentive to share by allowing the oil or
gas to escape from his well, thus draining such oil or gas from
under A's land.3 B cannot now resort to this method because of
state conservation laws. Can a state validly force A to share his
market? This question was answered in the affirmative in recent
Oklahoma cases.3 2 This result is consistent with the idea that rea-
sonableness simply requires that each owner be given an opportu-
nity to realize the value of the oil and gas underlying his land
prior to regulation. Of course, if there was actually no drainage
from B's tract to that of A, then it seems clear that the order would
be unreasonable.33
(5) Transportation.
30 For a collection of the conservation laws of the various states, see SECTION OF MIN-
ERAL LAW, A. B. A., CONSERV'ATION or Ott. AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY (Blakely M.
Murphy, 1948); SUMMEIws, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (Perm. ed. 1938), vols. 6 and 7.
Interesting problems arise as to the effect of governmental regulations upon the con-
tract rights of the parties. See, for example, Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893,
31 So. 2d 10 (1947) ; Criehton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946) ; Ohio Oil
Co. v. Kennedy, 28 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1946).
:1 This was what the one in B's position did in Hague v. Wheeler, cited supra note 16.
32 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950) afl'g 203
Okla. 35, 220 P. 2d 279 (1950) ; lephblic Natural Gas Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 350,
180 P. 2d 1009 (1947). Appeal to the United States Supreme Court in tile latter case
was dismissed on a procedural point. Set: supra note 21. As there poinled out, the opinI-
ions in that Court leave no doublt that if tile ease had been cousidered ,,n the merits,
the order would have been sustained.
s3 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., 300 U. S. 55 ( 1937).
1952)
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The final way to control production is by regulation of transpor-
tation of oil or gas produced. Such regulation by a state is, when
reasonable, valid as to intrastate movement, and to a limited
degree, valid as to interstate shipments. 4 Federal regulation is
authorized as to interstate shipments.
(b) Court review of legislative or administrative orders.
Many of the earlier cases attacking statutes or regulations as
unreasonable were instituted in the federal district courts. At first
this practice was at least by implication sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court,35 assuming, of course, the usual requisites
for federal jurisdiction were present. It seems to be the present
position of the Supreme Court, however, that admitting jurisdic-
tion in the lower federal courts, as a matter of policy those courts
should not take jurisdiction. Rather, the complaining party should
exhaust his remedies in the state courts, and, after this has been
done, he may ask the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction."
The methods of review in state courts vary. In Texas, for
example, the court action must be filed in the district court of
Travis Count)-, and review is limited to the question of whether
the Railroad Conunission order is reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence, adduced before the trial court, which question
is one of law.3" Appeal is available to an intermediate court and
sometimes directly from the trial court to the Texas Supreme
Court.3
:4 This discussion of governmental control omits the matter of federal legislation.
Briefly, until the products enter interstate commerce, regulation is left primarily with
the state governments. One notable exception is the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
as amended, which applies to any drilling activities which might result in a subse-
quent interstate movement, even though such activities result in a dry hole. Warren-
Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall. 317 U. S. 88 (1942) ; Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F.
2d 29 (9th Cir. 1944).
35 See, for example. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., cited supra note 33.
36 Burford v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U. S. 315 (1943) ; Railroad Commission v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940), 311 U. S. 614 (1941) ; id., 311 U. S. 570 (1941);
see Note, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1162 (1943).
37 Hawkins v. Texas Co.. 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. 2d 338 (1948).
38 TEx. CoNs-r. Art. 5. § 3-b: Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1738a; Rail-
road Commission v. Sterling Oil & Refining Co., 147 Tex. 549, 218 S. W. 2d 415 (1949);
Harris, A Reappraisal o. the Substantial Evidence Rule in Texas Administrative Law,
3 Southwestern L. J. 416 (1949).
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V
Severance of Mineral Interests from the Surface.
(a) In general.
All states recognize that interests may be owned in oil and gas
separate and apart from any title or interest in the surface. The
various theories as to the extent to which such an interest can be
owned have been discussed. Where the severance purports to vest
a fee title in a mineral interest, as distinguished from an attempted
severance by execution of an oil and gas lease or any other instru-
ment purporting to grant less than a full mineral interest, the
severed interest, except in Louisiana, is now usually treated as
having all of the elements of' a fee simple title."9 This is true
whether the question arises in a state applying the qualified owner-
ship doctrine or in one applying the absolute ownership doctrine.
There are various ways in which severance may occur. The
owner of the entire estate may execute a deed to the surface only;
he may in the granting clause of a deed purport to convey the
entire estate, but in a subsequent clause expressly except and
reserve the minerals; he may execute a deed granting only a
mineral interest; or he may execute an oil and gas lease.
(b) Grants of mineral interests other than oil and gas leases.
(1) Grant of a full mineral interest.
Assume that A conveys to B all of the minerals under a given
tract. The interest which B thereby acquires includes the follow-
ing: (a) a right to develop-that is, to drill wells upon the tract
in question and produce and market the oil and gas recovered;
(b) power to execute oil and gas leases; (c) right to bonuses paid
by the oil and gas lessee; (d) right to delay rentals payable by
:0' Sev. for example, Bodcaw 1,,nr C(o. v. (;oode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345, 29
A. L. I. 578 (1923) ; Callahan v. Marlin, 3 Cal. 2d1 I10, 43' P. 2d 788, 101 A. L. R. 371
41935) ; Jilek v. Chicago, Wilminigton & Franklin Coal Co., .382 III. 241, 47 N. E. 2d
96. l.i A. L. IL. 871 (194.3); Wilson v. IloIhn, 164 Kan. 299, 188 P. 2d 899 (1948);
Ilarker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 Pac. 468, L. R. A. 1918A, 487
0918) : Sthphens Cor,nty v. Mid-Kanas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290,
29 A. I.. I. 566 (1923).
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said lcssee; (e) right to royalties so payable; (f) right to any
other interests reserved to the lessor.
(2) Analysis of the above elements of a mineral interest.
(a) Right to develop. This is self-explanatory. The mineral
owner rarely uses this right. The expense of drilling a well when
balanced against the possibility of a dry hole is one factor con-
tributing to the result. Another is the necessity of specialized
knowledge and facilities as to the various phases of drilling and
development.
(b) Power to execute oil and gas leases. The customary method
employed by the mineral owner in attempting to secure produc-
tion is to execute an oil and gas lease. The oil and gas lessee is
usually an individual or company equipped to carry on the nec-
essary operations. Sometimes, however, one not so equipped will
secure a lease for speculative purposes. He does not intend to
operate under the lease but hopes to sell the lease at a profit.
(c) Right to bonuses. Most oil and gas leases provide for a
specific consideration. Usually such provision is for a cash pay-
ment, payable upon delivery of the lease. Sometimes it is payable
later, or in installments. In others it is payable out of and only if
there is production.4" This specific payment is called a bonus.
(d) Right to delay rentals. Most oil and gas leases provide for
a specific term, called the primary term, during which the lease
may be continued in force by periodic payments of money. These
payments are called delay rentals because by making them the
lessee delays the necessity of commencing drilling operations."'
(e) Right to royalties. Usually an oil and gas lease provides
that in the event of production, a stipulated proportion thereof
shall enure to the benefit of the lessor. In some lease forms the
provision defining this interest is worded to vest in the lessor an
undivided interest in the minerals; in others the lessor is simply
40 See, for example, State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex.
509, 143 S. W. 2d 757 (1940). When the payment is to be out of, and only if there is,
production, it is usually referred to as an oil payment.
41 The custom is to provide in the lease for a primary term of either five or ten years.
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given the right to share in the proceeds when the oil or gas is mar-
keted. Logically, the language used is important in determining
whether the interest of the lessor is realty or personalty. Looking
to the substance of the matter, however, which is that under either
form the lessor participates in the proceeds of production, it seems
that both forms should be treated alike.42
The interest reserved to the lessor is usually one-eighth of total
production or a right to the proceeds from a sale of one-eighth.
However, in California the lessor's fractionis frequently one-sixth.
There and elsewhere, when the land is established as being capable
of production, the lessor's royalty is often larger.4
Customarily, the interest of the royalty owner is not chargeable
with any of the drilling, operation or production expenses. It is
partly because of this factor that by the agreement the lessee is
given the larger interest. If, however, there is no ready market
available and the, lessee incurs unusual expenses in securing a
market, then the lessor may be liable for his proportionate share
of the expense.44
(3) Grant of one or more of the elements or parts of a mineral
interest.
Many times the interest granted or reserved is less than a full
mineral interest. Thus, A may sell to B all of the minerals but
reserve to himself the right to execute oil and gas leases. Or A
may reserve the right to lease and the right to bonuses. Or the
reservation may be of those two rights and of the right to delay
rentals. Or it may be limited to a right to share in royalties pay-
able under present and future oil and gas leases, either or both.
Whenever less than all of the elements of a mineral interest
(other than an oil and gas lease) are purportedly conveyed or
42 The suggested rule was applied in Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S. W. 2d
1021, 80 S. W. 2d 741 (1934).
C1 For a good discussion of the methods of paying the lessor, see 2 WALKER, CASES
OF OIL ANI) (GAS (1949) 572, 573.
44 Moier v. Lewis, 156 Kan. 544, 134 P. 2d 404 (1943), and a.uthorilies cited




reserved, serious and difficult problems arise as to whether such
grant or reservation violates the Rule against Perpetuities.
In a recent California case it was held that a reservation of a
right to execute oil and gas leases with no reservation of any
interest in production violated the Rule.45 Much more far-reaching
is the Kansas case of Lathrop v. Eyestone." This case held void an
attempted perpetual grant of a fractional interest in bonuses and
royalties payable under future leases executed by the grantor or
his assigns, at least insofar as the instrument purported to give
such power to assignees. The court reasoned that a future lease
might not be executed within the prescribed period and that no
interest could vest in payments under such lease until its creation.
The court's result was obviously influenced by its stated conclusion
that rights under oil and gas leases to bonuses and royalties are
personalty and not realty. The same question was presented re-
cently in Texas where an opposite result was reached.47 Thus,
under the Kansas view a perpetual royalty, or a similar interest, is
void, at least insofar as it purports to be in perpetuity. Under the
Texas view such an interest is valid, at least for as long as the one
with the power to execute leases also has an interest in production.
It is submitted that the Texas view is preferable, and it is hoped
that future cases will follow that view and reject the Kansas doc-
trine. If it be argued that the Kansas result is inevitable because
no right under a lease vests until its execution, it is submitted that
it can be argued at least with equal logic that the right vests
immediately and it is only its enjoyment which is delayed. Cer-
4 1 Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P. 2d 646 (1941).
46 170 Kan. 419, 227 P. 2d 136 (1951).
47 Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 230 S. W. 2d 346 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950), affirmed without discussion of, but necessarily with approval of, the hold-
ing on this point, 240 S. W. 2d 281 (Tex. 1951) ; Odstreil v. McGlaun, 230 S. W. 2d 353(Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; see also, Jones, Problems Presented by the Separation of the
Exclusire Leasing Power from Ownership of Land, Minerals or Royalty, in SOUTh-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUT. ON OIL ANI GAS LAW AND
TAXATION (1951) 271; Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties, 10
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 17 et seq. (1931) ; Walker, Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas
in Texas During the War Years-A Resume, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 18-20 (1946) ; Note,
15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 119 (1941).
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tainly the Texas rule more nearly fits the needs and customs of the
oil and gas industry.
Even the Texas rule leaves several problems unanswered. For
example, suppose the one with the power sells all of his interest
except that he attempts to reserve the power to lease, which, under
said view, was originally a valid power. Or suppose said party
reserves the power to lease and fractional interests in bonuses and
delay rentals but no interest in production. It is submitted that the
more the elements of a mineral interest remain attached to the
power to lease, the stronger the argument in favor of validity be-
comes, but that even under the Texas view it cannot at present be
safely assumed that a power to lease is valid where the purported
owner thereof has no interest in royalties payable thereunder at
the time he purports to exercise the power.
(4) Construction of the instrument which defines or attempts to
define the interest granted or reserved.
The above discussion assumed that there was no question about
the interest which the parties intended to create. Frequently, how-
ever, the instrument is ambiguous, or actually definies one of the
elements of a mineral interest when the parties intended to define
an entirely different one. This is particularly true when the ques-
tion is whether the interest intended is a full mineral interest or is
only a royalty interest-that is, a right to share in the royalties
reserved to the lessor in a present or in future oil and gas leases,
or both. This confusion results from the fact that Ihc words "roy-
alty" and "mineral" are frequently used interchiaigeably as re-
ferring to a full mineral interest. Suppose, for example, that A
conveys to B "the full royalty interest" in a given tract.
One view is that the word "royalty" is ambiguous and that
therefore even in a collateral attack upon the instrument parol
evidence is admissible to determine the intent of the parties. An-
other is that "royalty" is not ambiguous; that it clearly refers to
and is limited to the interest in production which is reserved to
1952]
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the lessor in oil and gas leases." As to which rule better reflects the
custom in the industry, for years "royalty" was frequently used
interchangeably with "mineral" as referring to all of a lessor's
rights in and as to oil and gas leases. In more recent years "roy.
alty" usually has been understood to refer only to the lessor's
interest in production.
(5) Rights under existing or future leases.
When the interest in question is limited to part of the lessor's
rights under oil and gas leases, and is silent as to duration, there
is presented the problem of whether the parties intend the grant to
continue in force for only as long as an existing oil and gas lease
remains in effect, or whether they intend the grant to be perpetual.
One view is that when the deed is silent as to duration, the grant is
with sole reference to the existing lease."9 It is submitted that a
better view is that in this situation the grant should be construed
as perpetual." This latter view seems to be the only one possibly
applicable when no lease is in effect at the time of the grant.
When the grant is of the full mineral interest, and is silent as
to oil and gas leases, then it seems clear that it is perpetual. Here,
however, the converse of the problem last discussed is presented.
That problem had to do with a specific grant of rights created or
to be created by an oil and gas lease. The present problem in-
volves a mineral grant which does not refer to any lease. As to
-' Oklahoma and Texas cases illustrate this difference in views. Melton v. Sneed,
188 Okla. 388, 109 P. 2d 509,(1940) ; Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 630, 101 S. W.
2d 543, 544 (1937) ; cf. Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 68 P. 2d 773 (1937). In the
Schlittler case the court said:
"The words 'royalty€,' 'bonus,' and 'rentals' have a well-understood meaning in the
oil and gas business. Likewise, 'minerals' and 'mineral rights' have a well-recognized
meaning. Broadly speaking a reservation of minerals and mineral rights without limita-
tion would include royalties, bonuses and rentals. A conveyance of land without reser-
vations would include all minerals and mineral rights. However, it is well settled that
a grantor may reserve minerals or mineral rights and he may also reserve royalties,
bonuses and rentals, either one, more or all. Here we have a reservation of only 'royalty
rights.' It is obvious, it seems to us, that this does not include a reservation of bonuses
or rentals, but only of an interest in oil, gas or minerals paid, received or realized as
'royalty' under any lease existing on the land at the time of the reservation, or there-
after executed by the grantee, his heirs or assigns."
49 Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Pac. 52 (1927).
50 Schlittler v. Smith, cited supra note 48. And see Notes, 122 A. L. R. 959 (1939)
and 4 A. L. R. 2d 492 (1948).
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future leases, the answer is easy. The grantee will be entitled to
execute such leases and to receive all benefits thereby vested in the
lessor. As to a lease in existence at the time of the grant, the an-
swer may depend on whether the rights created by that lease
(bonuses, rentals and royalties) are treated as personalty or as
realty, or on whether such rights are considered as incident to
mineral ownership or as incident to surface ownership. While
there is a conflict, it is submitted that the better view is that all
unaccrued benefits under an existing lease pass to the mineral
grantee.5 '
(6) The question of whether a given interest is realty or
personalty.
This question is often an important one. It may be a decisive
factor in determining whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable,
whether title to the interest can be lost by abandonment, whether
the interest passes by a conveyance of the land which does not
specifically refer to the interest, and whether it is taxable as real
estate. With many courts starting with the premise that it is impos-
sible to have title to oil and gas until capture, confusion as to
whether the interest, whatever it may be called, is realty or per-
sonalty was inevitable. Modern decisions are fairly uniform in
holding a full mineral interest to be realty. Confusion continues
when the interest consists of simply an element of a mineral in-
terest. Most of the cases involving the question are concerned with
royalty interests, because sales of such interests are much more
voluminous than sales of other interests. In the same jurisdiction
the court may hold a royalty interest to be personalty for one pur-
pose and realty for another. Even in a state which recognizes the
right to create a realty interest in royalty, the answer to whether
it is realty may depend on the wording of the instrument, i.e.,
whether it purports to vest an immediate interest, or whether it
51 This view was adopted in Texas in Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S. W. 2d
302 (1943), wherein the court expressly overruled a prior inconsistent case. For a
good discussion of earlier cases see Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and
Royalties, 10 Tex. L Rev. 1, 29-33 (1931).
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purports to grant an interest which will not become effective until
after severance.
It is submitted that at least as to royalty, the better view is to
treat the interest of one entitled thereto as an interest in realty, and
that this should be done regardless of the language used in creating
the interest.52
(7) Some of the advantages and disadvantages of buying a
royalty as distinguished from a full mineral interest.
The obvious disadvantage is that as the royalty owner has no
power to execute oil and gas leases or himself to develop, he is
largely at the mercy of the owner of the power to lease. True, the
statement is sometimes found that the one with the power owes
some sort of a duty to the royalty owner, but it would probably be
difficult to establish such duty and its breach except in extreme
cases.5" This disadvantage is even more important as to a term
royalty-a royalty interest which will continue for a specific num-
ber of years and as long thereafter as production continues.
Another disadvantage is that the royalty owner acquires no
interest in any of the other elements of a mineral interest. These
include the right to develop, to execute oil and gas leases and to
collect as owner all bonuses and delay rentals.
On the credit side, the royalty interest does not contribute to
the interest of the oil and gas lessee, frequently referred to as the
working interest. Thus, the owner of a 1/16 mineral interest would
be entitled to execute a lease and to proportionate bonuses and
delay rentals thereunder, but would have to grant a part of his
1 See Hickey v. Dirks, 156 Kan. 326, 133 P. 2d 107 (1943) ; Gulf Production Co.
v. Continental Oil Co.. 139 Tex. 183, 164 S. W. 2d 488 (1942) ; Waco-Tex. Materials Co.
v. Lee. 210 S. W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Dashko v. Friedman, 59 S. W. 2d 203
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Notes, 90 A. L. R. 770 (1934), 101 A. L. R. 884 (1936), 131
A. L. R. 1371 (1941). In the Gulf Production case the question was important to a
determination of whether the husband could accept something other than money in
lieu of delay rentals. If this amounted to a change in a realty interest, the joinder of
the wife was necessary because the property was homestead. The court first held that
realty was involved, but withdrew that opinion and in the cited opinion in effect
treats the delay rental interest as personalty.
-3 Schlittler v. Smith, cited supra note 48. In McCall v. Nettles, 37 So. 2d 635 (Ala.
1948). the duty was compared to that of a trustee.
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interest to the lessee. Under the usual lease, he would grant 1/16
of 7/s, thereby reserving a right to share in only 1/16 of 1/8, or
1/128 of gross. On the other hand, the owner of a 1/16 royalty
interest would not be a necessary party to the lease and would not
be entitled to any bonuses or rentals; however, in the event of pro-
duction under an oil and gas lease, he would be entitled to receive
1/16 of gross production free of costs."
(8) Effect of attempt by one with power to lease to pool the
royalty interest with the royalty interest in another tract.
Many times an oil and gas lessee takes a single lease from
owners of adjoining tracts. This lease may have an express provi-
sion pooling the interests of lessors, or such pooling may be
implied. Similarly, many leases covering a tract as to which one
party has power to lease authorize the lessee to pool this tract
with another. How far will such an agreement by one with a power
to lease be binding on the royalty owner in one of the tracts
pooled? There are three possible solutions: (1) the power to lease
includes the power to pool the royalty with royalty in an adjoin-
ing tract; (2) the power to lease does not include a power to pool;
however, as to the tract as to which the power to lease exists; the
lease will be held valid, the pooling provision being a nullity; (3)
the entire lease, because of the attempt to pool, will be held to be
a nullity. The second possible solution is believed preferable.55
(9) Some of the questions to consider in analyzing a proposed
royalty or other mineral element transaction.
(a) Is it the intent of the parties to limit the interest to royalty
•" As heretofore indicated, difficult problems can arise as to whether a given inter-
est i,-,ropcly to be conslrued as a .mineral interest or as a royalty interest. Fre-
quently there is the added problem of whether the fraction refers to gross production
or to a fractional share of royalties. Thus, 1/16 of royalties, if the lease provided for
a 1/8 royalty, would clearly grant only a right to 1/128 of gross production. See, for
example, Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Pac. 52 (1927) ; Watkins v. Slaughter,
144 Tex. 179, 189 S. W. 2d 699 (1945) ; Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S. W.
2d 563 (1945).
., This rule was applied in Parker v. Parker, 144 S. W. 2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) er. ref. See also Peerless Oil Co. v. Tipken, 190 Okla. 396, 124 P. 2d 418 (1942)
Note, 116 A. L. R. 1267 (1938).
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payments, with no interest in any of the other elements of a
mineral interest?
(b) Will one of the parties be left with an interest possibly
void under the Rule against Perpetuities, or the rule against un-
reasonable restrictions upon alienation?
(c) Does the instrument cover a situation wherein the owner of
the elements other than royalty develops, as distinguished from
development under a lease providing for royalties?
(d) Is there a minimum royalty provision-that is, that in no
event shall a lease be executed providing for less than a 1/8
royalty, or whatever other fraction is agreed upon?
(e) Is the royalty to be limited to a single lease? Is it to be for
a term of years and as long thereafter as production continues?
Is it to be perpetual?
(f) Are the duties of the one with the power to lease adequately
defined?
(g) Is the problem of pooling sufficiently covered-both with
reference to any existing pool and with reference to the right to
pool in the future?56
(h) Does the instrument have a "mother hubbard" clause? This
is a clause providing that the deed covers not only the specifically
described property but also any adjoining property, or, sometimes,
any property in an adjoining survey. It is frequently found in
lease forms, but infrequently in mineral grants. Its purpose is to
pick up strips to which the grantor has acquired limitation title.
Of course, the grantor should refuse to include such a clause if he
knows he owns other property which would be caught thereby, and
which other property the parties do not intend to cover.
(i) Is the power to lease adequately defined? The usual printed
forms provide for a right of ingress and egress, and such right
56 Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 188 S. W. 2d 564 (1945) ; Brown v. Smith,
141 Tex. 425, 174 S. W. 2d 43 (1943). There is a conflict of authority as to whether
an existing interest in a pool passes as an incident to a mineral grant. See Tanner v.
Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P. 2d 383 (1942) ; Merrill Engineering Co. v.
Capitol National Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
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would in any event be inferred in favor of a mineral grantee unless
expressly negatived by the deed."7 However, this right of ingress
and egress usually falls far short of the surface rights which most
lease forms purport to vest in a lessee. This point must be watched
in securing a mineral grant from the owner of both the surface
and minerals, and also in analyzing the interest validly vested in
a lessee by a lease executed by one owning no surface interest.
(j) Are rights under an existing lease adequately defined where
the conveyance is of an interest in a part only of the property
under lease? Assume that the lease covers Section 4, which in-
cludes 640 acres. A conveys to B the minerals in the northwest
one-fourth of said section. The deed recites that the sale is subject
to any outstanding valid lease but covers and includes one-fourth
of all rentals and royalties payable thereunder. Notice that two
interests or estates have been granted. One covers a situation where
the mineral interest is unleased; the other the situation while the
present lease is in effect. A literal interpretation of the instrument
is that the grantee will receive one-fourth of all royalties paid
under the lease, whether from production from the tract described
in the mineral deed or from production elsewhere." To avoid this
result, there should always be at least added the phrase, "in so far
as said lease covers the above described land." Problems incident
to a deed with such a clause will be next considered.
Assume that in the last mentioned conveyance from A to B of
a mineral interest in the northwest one-fourth of said section, the
phrase had been added, "in so far as said lease covers the above
described land." Under the majority view this would grant to B
one-fourth of royalties payable by virtue of production on said
northwest one-fourth. It would grant to him no rights whatever as
to production from any other part of the leased property, and he
would have no right to complain because mincrals were being
•"Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N. E. 2d 96,
146 A. L. It. 871 (1943), and cscs there cited; Melton v. Si','I, 188 Okla. 388, 109
P. 2d 509 (1940) (overruling a prior case).
58 Hoffman v. Magnolia Petrolcum Co., 273 S. W. 828 Tx. Go,,,. A.pp. 1925).
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drained from under his tract. 9 Of course, if this is the intention
of the parties, the lawyer's duty is met when he inserts this clause.
Frequently, however, either this is affirmatively not the intention,
or the parties simply have not considered the point one way or
another. Sometimes they will desire to "spread" the royalty pay.
ments-that is, to provide that grantor and grantee shall partici-
pate on the basis of the acreage contributed by each, regardless
of where the wells are located. Thus, under this arrangement B
would be entitled to 160/640 of all royalties, regardless of the
well locations. To effectuate this intent, the "in so far as" clause
should be followed by a clause reading substantially as follows:
"Provided, however, that all royalties accruing under and by
virtue of said oil and gas lease, regardless of where the well or
wells are located, shall be treated as an entirety and shall be
divided between and paid to grantor and grantee herein in the
proportion that the acreage owned by each bears to the entire
leased acreage."60
Assume that in said conveyance from .4 to B of the minerals in
the northwest one-fourth of said section, this provision had been
added: "This grant shall continue for 10 years from date and as
long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced." If the
property is not under lease at the time of the grant, B, under the
majority view, can take steps to assure that a well will be drilled
during said primary term; if, however, the land is under lease at
the time of the grant, B is largely at the mercy of the lessee. This
points to the advisability of adding a clause to the effect that pro-
duction anywhere upon leased premises will continue the mineral
interest in effect. In states in which forced pooling is permissible,
or even where it might become permissible-and that would in-
clude any state-an added provision should be inserted to the
effect that production anywhere in such a pooled area would con-
5i Carlock v. Krig, 151 Kan. 407, 99 P. 2d 858 (1940) (citing cases holding both
ways) ; Japhet v. W. C. McRae, 276 S. W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
6o Similar explanatory clauses should be used where interests other than royalties
are involved, as, for example, oil payments.
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tinue the interest in effect.61 If the lease itself authorizes the lessee
to pool, a similar provision should be inserted. In fact, to cover
all contingencies in this regard, a catch-all clause could be used,
as, for example, "in the event the tract hereby conveyed is now or
hereafter becomes part of a validly pooled tract, then production
anywhere upon said pooled tract will continue this interest in
effect." Notice that this question is in addition to and different
from that of the rights of a grantee in production from a tract not
described in the deed.
Another point which the parties to a term grant should con-
sider is whether production to continue the grant in effect would
have to be in paying quantities. Production in paying quantities
means sufficient production that after payment of amounts reserved
to the lessor, and expenses incident to production, the lessee, or
his assigns, could still show a profit. In several states the haben-
dum clause of an oil and gas lease which simply states "as long
thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced" has been
construed to mean "produced in paying quantities."62 To avoid this
question as to a term mineral or royalty deed, the intention of the
parties should be ascertained and then clearly defined. Thus, if
the parties intend to require paying quantities, the phrase "in
paying quantities" should be added. If they intend any production
to be sufficient, there should be added, "whether or not in paying
quantities." If it is a matter of construing a deed which has
omitted express definition, then the problem is whether the deci-
sions concerning oil and gas leases are applicable to term mineral
grants, and if so, whether they should be followed in a state in
which the question is open. While the lease cases are at least per-
suasive, it seems that they are not necessarily controlling. They
are based on the premise that the primary objective of an oil and
01 Louisiana reaches this result even in the absence of an express provision to such
effect.
62Walden v. Potts, 194 Okla. 453, 152 P. 2d 923 (1944); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh,
121 Okla. 135, 248 Pac. 329 (1926) ; Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S. W. 2d 509
(1942), and cases there cited.
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gas lease is to secure production in paying quantities; that the
parties did not intend to authorize the lessee to produce at a loss,
but still hold the lease for speculative purposes. This is not usually
a primary objective in a mineral deed. Here a term is usually
inserted to avoid forever encumbering the full fee simple title to
an undeveloped tract of land.
A final word of caution as to a term mineral or royalty interest
should be stated. Sometimes the parties state the term but omit
the "and as long thereafter" clause. Of course, where this is done,
the interest will end with the term even though there be produc-
tion.63
(k) Will the proposed mineral deed have the effect of reviving
by ratification an oil and gas lease which has terminated? Fre-
quently the parties to a mineral grant do not know definitely
whether the last lease executed is still in effect. In many instances
if they make the grant subject to such lease, this reference will
be held to have revived it. 4 To avoid this possibility, it is usually
advisable to word the lease reference substantially as follows:
"This grant is subject to any valid, recorded 5 oil, gas and mineral
lease, but covers and includes. ."
(1) Is the deed actually a deed as distinguished from a quit-
claim? This problem is, of course, not peculiar to an oil and gas
conveyance. Briefly, it might be important in determining whether
one is a bona fide purchaser; whether after-acquired title in the
grantor would inure to the benefit of the grantee; whether there
has been a breach of warranty; and whether a fractional interest
133 Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 175 S. W. 2d 401 (1943). This case offers a
possible alternative to the grantee-that possibly a correct construction would be that
as to any lease in existence at the time of the grant, the grantee's interest will be
extended by production under that lease.
64 See, for example, Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Hodge, 147 Tex. 115, 213 S. W. 2d
456 (1948). The opinion in this case includes language indicating that ratification
follows as a matter of law, even Ihough not intended. When it is considered that the
lessee is not even a party to the mineral deed, it is submitted that actual intent should
be a factor.
65 The reference to "recorded" is to avoid ratification by the grantee of a valid but
unrecorded lease, which otherwise the grantee would cut off as a bona fide purchaser.
Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 807 (1947).
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reserved elsewhere in the deed is referable to the entire title or
simply to the title of the grantor at the time of the deed."8
(in) Is a warranty included, and if so, is it special or general?6"
(10) Some of the points to consider where less than a full inter-
est is assigned or reserved.
(a) Right of owner of a fractional mineral interest to develop
or to authorize development. The majority view is that the owner
of a partial interest has a right to develop or to empower a lessee
to do so. As long as this is done in good faith, the partial owner
or his lessee need only account to the other owner for his interest
less reasonable drilling and operating costs.6" Thus, A, owning a
one-half mineral interest, leases to Rex Oil Company. B, owning
the other one-half, does not lease. A would receive a free 1/16 of
gross production (assuming a usual 1/8 royalty provision in the
lease). Rex would be entitled to the rest of production until reim-
bursed for reasonable expenditures. Thereafter, Rex would have
to account to B for 1/. of total production, less reasonable expen-
ditures, to A for a free 1/16 of gross, and would be entitled to
appropriate the balance, if any.
Under the minority view consent of all owners is essential be-
fore there can be development.6"
(b) Designating the fraction. The parties frequently think of
the interest of the grantor as 1/, because of the custom of reserv-
ing a 1/8 royalty. With this in mind, the parties in attempting to
convey -/ of the grantor's interest have sometimes designated this
interest as "one-half of the grantor's one-eighth," or, worse, "one-
half of one-eighth of the minerals."7 The advisable course is to
66 The last problem is dealt with subsequently.
67 The problem is merely mentioned ,caosc it is a general one incident to any
conveyance. It should be kept in mind that usually liability on a warranty is limited
to the purchase price received. and that many Iines this arn'Jnt will be far less than
the later value of a mineral interest.
68 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F. 2d 566, 40 A. I. I. 1389 (8th Cir. 1924), and
cases there cited: see Note, 5 A. L. It. 241 1368 (1949).
69 Louisiana, West Virginia and Illinois have applied the minority view. For a
good discussion with citations, see I WAL.KR., CASES (ON Ott. AND GAS (1949) 386, 387.
70 See, for example, Richardson v. I lart, 143 Tex .392, 185 S. W. 2d 563 (1945).
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use the same fraction throughout the instrument. Thus, in the pres-
ent example, in the absence of a lease, the deed should convey a
1/. mineral interest. The grantee, if and when he executed a lease,
would then be required to contribute his proportionate share to
the lessee and would be entitled to 1/2 of royalties and other pay-
ments under the lease. If a lease is outstanding, the original grant
should be of 1/. Then in referring to rights under the existing
lease, the same fraction should be used. Thus, if there is a valid
outstanding lease in favor of Rex Oil Company, the deed should
recite, "said land being under an oil and gas lease to Rex Oil
Company, this deed is subject to that lease, but covers and includes
1/., of all rentals, royalties or other interests or amounts payable
thereunder, in so far as said lease covers the above described
land." 7'
(c) The "double fraction" danger. A, owning an undivided
one-half mineral interest executes a quitclaim deed in favor of B.
The granting clause reads "all of my right, title and interest."
Later in the instrument appears the clause, "there is reserved from
this grant an undivided 1/4 mineral interest to A." This raises the
question whether the parties intend for A to reserve 1/4 of the
interest granted, that is, 1/4 of 1.2, or 1/4 of the whole.72
(d) When it is advisable to convey undivided acres rather than
a specific fraction. Many times the agreement is with reference
to the number of acres to be conveyed. For example, assume that
royalty is selling in a given area at $100 per acre. B desires to
purchase a 10-acre interest in a 100-acre tract. There are two ways
in which to describe this interest. It may be referred to as an
undivided 10-royalty-acre interest;73 or it may be converted into
a fraction, by taking as a numerator the number of acres to be
-1 Of course, if it is intended that the grantee share in production from other land
under the lease, an added clause would be necessary.
.2 Hooks v. Neill, 21 S. W. 2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er. ref. See also Pollock
v. McAlester Fuel Co., 215 Ark. 842, 223 S. W. 2d 813 (1949) ; King v. First National
Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S. W. 2d 260 (1946).
73 Of course, if the conveyance is of a mineral interest, the reference should be to
mineral acres.
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conveyed and as a denominator the number of acres in the tract.
Thus, under the second method the fraction would be 10/100.
Sometimes the parties will be mistaken as to the total number of
acres in the tract. In this event, the fraction method would not
effectuate the intention of the parties. If the tract actually con-
tained 200 acres and the deed conveyed a 1/10, the grantee would
receive a twenty-acre interest. If the tract contained only 20 acres,
he would receive a two-acre interest. Notice that if undivided
acres had been used, in either instance the grantee would receive
ten acres, which, in the example, is what he paid for.
From the lessee's standpoint, the fraction method is always pref-
erable because payments then can be computed with certainty. If
one owns a 1/10 mineral interest, we know that he is entitled to
1/10 of bonuses, rentals and royalties. If he owns an undivided
10-acre interest, we do not know to what he is entitled until we
ascertain total acreage.
(e) Effect of a prior sale. Suppose that A first sells a 1/ inter-
est to B. A later executes a deed in favor of C, but with a reserva-
tion of a 1/9 interest to A. If the parties intend that A shall actually
own a one-half interest after the sale to C, this intention would be
defeated. This follows from either of two rules: (1) there is a
presumption that A by the reservation simply intended to refer to
the prior grant to B; (2) even if A intended to reserve to himself
the one-half interest, it would nevertheless jump to C under a doc-
trine similar to that of after-acquired title." Therefore, in analyz-
ing a (Iced with a reservation it is important to ascertain and keep
in mind the interest owned by the grantor at the time of the reser-
vation. In preparing such a deed, it is important to refer to both the
prior grant and the interest to be reserved to the grantor. Another
method is to provide expressly that the reserved interest is to be
owned by the grantor and that in no event, by warranty, estoppel
or otherwise, shall grantee acquire any interest in such reserved
interest.
74 Duhig v. Peavey-Moore I.Imlber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S. W. 2d 878 (1940).
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(f) A reference back. It is pointed out that all of the matters
discussed with reference to a conveyance of a full interest are
equally applicable to a conveyance of a fractional interest.
(c) Analysis of a typical oil and gas lease and the interest
thereby created."
Under the qualified ownership theory, it is impossible to vest
a fee title by execution of an oil and gas lease. This immediately
poses the problem whether in such states the interest should be
treated as realty or as personalty. This in turn will determine,
among other matters, whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable,
whether the registration statutes apply, whether the interest is tax-
able as realty, and whether the interest can be lost by abandon-
ment. The cases are in much confusion as to whether the interest
is realty or personalty. It is clear that because of the large amounts
frequently involved in transactions in this field, justice is best
served by treating the interest as realty. This factor, when added
to the consideration that actually an oil and gas lease does vest a
present interest in land (even assuming the premise that there can-
not be actual title to oil and gas until discovery), has resulted in
a definite trend in favor of treating the interest as one in realty.76
The remainder of this article will be devoted to an analysis of
the various provisions usually included in an oil and gas lease.
(1) The date. The date the parties intend the instrument to
become effective should be inserted. Some of the older forms have
a blank for the date at the top of the instrument and another at the
bottom. To avoid confusion, only the top date should be used.
When a ratification instrument, or a lease amendment, or a
1, This subject is treated at length in SOUTHWESTERN LFCAI. FOUNDATION SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON Oi. AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION (1951).
76 For a good discussion see Summers, Validity of Oil and Gas Leases, 34 Yale L.
J. 383 (1925). The cases in each state are collected in 1 SUtMMras, THE LAW OF OIL,
AND GAS (Perm. ed. 1938) § 155 et. seq. See also, KwI.', CASES ON OIL AN! GAS (3d
ed. 1947) 91 et seq. Even in a state recognizing power to vest title by an oil and gas
lease, there is a possible question whether the language in a given lease does so. II is
submitted that the better view is that taken by the Texas Supreme Court, that sulb-
stance and not language should control. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas
Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290, 29 A. L. R. 566 (1923).
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correction lease is executed, it is important to provide expressly
which date shall govern. In one case where the dates were dif-
ferent, the lessee paid delay rentals on the basis of the date in the
correction instrument. These payments were held insufficient on the
ground the date in the original lease controlled.77
(2) Lessors. Generally, the rules applicable to sales of other
interests control in determining the parties who must execute in
order to create a valid oil and gas lease. There are several prob-
lems more or less peculiar to this field, however, which merit brief
discussion.
(a) Securing a lease from less than all of the owners. This
problem has been discussed from the lessor's standpoint. From
the lessee's standpoint, the following factors should be considered:
Is the land in a state which authorizes development under such
a lease?7"
Assuming a right to develop, can this be done profitably under
the rule that the lessee must account to the non-joining owner for
the latter's proportionate interest in gross, less reasonable ex-
penses?
How strong is the possibility of partition?79 In the event of
partition, how probable is it that partition will be by sale, or, if in
kind, that the desirable part of the tract will be allocated to your
lessee-client? An important matter in connection with the last ques-
tion is whether by prior dealings by the tenant in common execut-
ing the lease, or by the other owners, or by all of them, prior
equities have been created. Conceivably, such equities might result
in the lease in question actually passing no interest at all."0
(b) Life tenant and remainderinan. The general rule is that
77 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. 2d 770 (1946).
78 See text at notes 68 and 69 supra.
71, In some states partition is a matter of right. In others it is di-crction, ry. In still
others there cannot be partition of leasehold estates. Even after it is d,.ci.d that there
will be partilion, the problem remains of wlici her it Shall bc by a:1 or in kind. The
authorilies are collected and discussed in 2 WALKER:, CAsKs iN (It. AND CAS (1949)
c. \11.
81 See, for example. Simp~on-Fell Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil C o., 136 T'ux. 158. 125
S. W. 2d 263, 146 S. W. 2d 723 (1939).
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both a life tenant and remainderman are necessary parties to a
lease. st An exception exists, known as the open mine doctrine,
where at the time the life estate begins there is production. Even
here, however, it would usually be inadvisable to deal only with
the life tenant because upon his death the lease would terminate.
In the event of production under a valid lease, the problem is
presented of how royalty payments should be distributed, absent,
of course, any express statement in this respect.
If the open mine doctrine is applicable, the life tenant is entitled
to all royalty payments accruing during his lifetime."2 If it is not
applicable, the money should be invested and interest paid to the
life tenant, the corpus going to the remainderman upon such
tenant's death."3 In the absence of an agreement between the
life tenant and remainderman, the lessee is faced with the alterna-
tive of withholding payments or filing an interpleader suit.
(c) Possible unborn owners. When a possible owner is not in
being, how is his interest to be covered? Kansas holds that a court
of equity has inherent power to appoint a trustee to represent un-
sI See Note, 43 A. L. R. 811 (1926). Apparently contra the usual rule is Davis v.
Atlantic Oil Refining Co., 87 F. 2d 75 (5th Cir. 1936).
82 The open mine doctrine is usually applied where there is actual production at
the time the life estate is created. It has also been held applicable where production has
been authorized prior to inception of the life estate. Bramer v. Bramer, 84 W. Va. 168,
99 S. E. 329 (1919) ; see note 81. An interesting question is presented where oil and
gas leases were executed prior to the creation of the life estate, but none were in
effect at the time of such creation. The open mine doctrine was applied in a Texas
case to give the surviving spouse all royalties from a probate homestead. White v.
Blackman, 168 S. W. 2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref. w.o.m. Cf. Brandenburg v.
Petroleum Exploration Co., 218 Ky. 557, 291 S. W. 757 (1927) ; Lawley v. Richardson,
101 Okla. 40, 223 Pac. 156, 43 A. L. R. 803 (1924).
s. Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co. 141 Kan. 147, 40 P. 2d 463 (1935) ; Aldridge v. Houston
Oil Co., 116 Okla. 281, 244 Pac. 782 (1926), and cases there cited; Davis v. Bond,
138 Tex. 206, 158 S. W. 2d 297 (1942). In the absence of an agreement, court action
as to actually investing the money is necessary. Davis v. Bond. su pra. A similar ques-
tion is presented as to bonuses, delay rentals, and other payments tinder a lease. It
seems that bonuses should be treated as corpus and thus subject to the same rules
as royalties. It could be reasonably argued that the same is true of delay rentals. How-
ever, there is authority to the contrary. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson,
76 F. 2d 776 (5th Cir. 1935) ; Aldridge v. 1-louston Oil Co.. supra; Andrews v. Brown,
283 S. W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), retdd on other grounds, 10 S. W. 2d 707 (Tex.
Comm App. 1928). The Aldridge case lends support to a contention that bonls or any
other payment prior to production should be treated as income.
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born beneficiaries."' Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Texas
have statutes concerning the problem. 5
(d) Persons acting in a representative capacity. Most problems
here are not peculiar to oil and gas. Mistakes in the past suggest
the importance of bearing in mind the elemental rule that each
state has exclusive jurisdiction of land within its borders. Thus, if
a guardian's lease on Oklahoma land is desired, the guardianship
laws of that state must be complied with.
Another point to remember is that powers delegated to one
without title are strictly construed. Even in a state regarding an oil
and gas lease as a sale, it does not follow that power to sell in-
cludes power to execute an oil and gas lease.8 6
(e) Effect of joinder as lessors in a single lease of owners of
separate tracts. As heretofore discussed, such joinder, under a
usual lease form, has been held to result in an implied pooling of
such tracts.8 7
(3) Lessee. There are no unusual problems here. It is impor-
tant, although not necessary, to include the lessee's address. This
facilitates giving and receiving notices required in other parts of
the lease.
(4) The bonus and granting clause. The bonus is the consid-
eration, usually cash, paid to the lessor. In determining whether a
bonus or some other consideration is necessary, the question
whether the lease constitutes a conveyance becomes very important.
Thus, if it is a conveyance, no consideration would be necessary.
84 Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P. 2d 587 (1935).
85 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 53-302 et seq.; Ky. REV. STAT. (1946) § 381.420; 60
OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. ed. 1949) § 71; TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1950 Supp.)
art. 23 2 0 c. See 1 WALKER, CASES ON OI. AND GAS (1949) 418.
80 Avis v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 141 Tex. 489, 174 S. W. 2d 255
(1943); Bean v. Bean, 79 S. W. 2di 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) er. rel. The Avis case
sometimes has been erroneously relied upon as supporting the view that a power of
sale includes power to lease. In fact, the court expressly left that question open. See
also T:x. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 7425b and the other authorities col-
lecied in 1 WA.KEn, CASES ON 01. AND) GAS (1949) 452-455.
S7 .CC text at note 55 supra.
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Otherwise a consideration would be necessary. 8
(5) Property description. The only part of this section peculiar
to the oil and gas field is the "mother hubbard" clause. This clause,
heretofore mentioned, sometimes provides that the lease covers
any land owned or claimed by the lessor and which adjoins the
land specifically described. Sometimes the provision is made
broader to include land in adjoining surveys, even though not
contiguous to the specifically described tract. Obviously, this
clause should be deleted or modified in any instance in which it
would cover land owned by the lessor and which the parties do not
intend to include in the lease. 9
(6) The habendum clause. This clause designates the time dur-
ing which the lease can be held without production, usually five
years or ten years, and then provides "and as long thereafter as
oil, gas or other mineral is produced." Literally construed, pro-
duction would be sufficient whether or not in paying quantities.
However, several recent cases have held that by implication the
clause requires production in paying quantities."0 From the les-
see's standpoint it is advisable to include the phrase "whether or
not in paying quantities." The premise in the cases implying "pay-
ing quantities" is that the parties do not intend that the lessee,
though operating at a loss, can hold the lease for speculative pur-
poses. Admitting this premise, the question of whether production
is in paying quantities is frequently a difficult one. It is to avoid
this dangerous fact question that a specific provision is advisable.
Literally construed, the habendum clause requires actual pro-
duction to hold the lease. In other words, it is not sufficient that
a well is completed which is capable of producing. Under one
-s 2 SUMM SIs, THE LAW OF OIL ANp GAS (Perm. ed. 1938) § 233 et seq. See also,
KULP. CASES ON OIL AND GAS (3rd ed. 1948) 95.
st, There is an "unwritten law" in the oil and gas industry that tracts inadvertently
caught will be released. However, as is true of otier such "laws," it is not always
complied with. For cases involving such clauses, see United Gas Public Service Co.
v. Mitchell. 188 La. 651, 177 So. 697 (1937) ; Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp., 193
Miss. 675, 9 So. 2d 648 (1942) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S. W. 2d 442
(1935).
VO Cases cited supra note 62.
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view the clause is literally construed and actual production is nec-
essary. 91
Another view is that if the well is capable of production in pay-
ing quantities, the habendum holds the lease for as long as the
lessee diligently seeks a market.92 This matter is now usually
covered by specific provisions in the lease. All cases agree that
a temporary cessation of production does not terminate the lease.93
All cases further agree that when production is not sufficient,
termination, insofar as the habendum clause is concerned, is auto-
matic. It is simply a matter of a conditional estate ending by its
own terms, no question of forfeiture being involved.
Of course, here as elsewhere, there is always the possibility that
the lessor may so act as to estop himself from asserting that the lease
has terminated, or as to ratify and thus reinstate said lease.
(7) The royalty paragraph. No attempt will be made herein to
analyze the customary royalty provisions. One rather recent inno-
vation, however, should be mentioned-the shut-in royalty provi-
sion. This provision is to give the lessee a sure way to keep the
lease in effect when he has a well capable of producing, but no
market therefor. It provides that in such an instance, stipulated
payments can be made and that as long as they are made, the situa-
tion shall be the same as if there were actual production. From
the lessee's standpoint it would be advisable to make this clause
applicable to both oil and gas. However, because it is usually feas-
ible to find a market for oil within a reasonably short time, the
usual shut-in clause does not apply to a well capable of producing
oil. Thus, oil can be shipped to market by truck or tank car. Gas,
on the other hand, can be transported practicably only by pipe line.
The earlier shut-in clauses were restricted to wells capable of
f" Slanolind Oil and Ga, Co. v. larnhill, 107 S. W. 2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 19341
cr. ref.
, Christianson v. Champhin Refining Co., 169 F. 2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948), involving
Kansas law and in which trior Kansas dlrisihns are di-cisscd and distinguished;
Easlrn Oil Co. v. Conlehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
1,:1 Sc, for example. :hristianson v. (lhampiin Refining Co.. :id in note 92; Wat-
son v. Rochinill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S. W. 2d 783, 137 A. 1. It. 10:12 (1941).
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producing gas only. The more recent forms have expanded the
clause to read substantially as follows: "if gas only, or gas con-
densate and/pr other liquefiable hydrocarbons ......
There is one important distinction between holding the lease in
force by actual production and seeking to hold it by shut-in pay-
ments. If there is sufficient actual production, then failure to pay
royalties, or erroneous payment thereof, would not terminate the
lease, because it is the production, not the payment therefor, which
keeps the lease alive. On the other hand, if it is a shut-in-payment,
the payment and it alone can keep the lease in effect. Hence, unless
such payment is timely and correctly paid, the lease will automati-
cally terminate as to the parties not correctly paid.94
(8) The pooling provision. Of course, from the lessee's stand-
point, a provision authorizing the lessee to pool the leased tract
with other tracts is very desirable. This provision sometimes limits
the right to relatively small units as to oil and to larger units as to
gas. Sometimes, however, there is no acreage limitation.95 From
the lessor's standpoint, such a clause may be undesirable. After
pooling and as a result thereof numerous parties originally own-
ing interests in other tracts may have interests or claims in the
leased premises.96 Further, the lessor may be forced to share pro-
ceeds from production from his tract with owners of other tracts.
Conversely, he may share in production from an adjoining tract,
which otherwise would be lost to him under the law of capture,
even though the oil or gas was in fact drained from beneath his
tract.
It is again pointed out that in determining the validity of a
pooling provision, it is necessary to analyze carefully the extent
'of the power of the one executing the lease.
(9) The delay rental clause. This provision authorizes the
lessee to hold the lease during the primary term by periodic money
'4 Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S. W. 2d 339 (1943).
" For examples of pooling provision, see 3 STAYTON ANN. TEX. FoRMs (1948) §§
4145-4147.
"o See, for example, \Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S. W. 2d 472 (1942).
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payments to either the lessor or to his credit in a designated de-
pository bank. The usual modern lease forms condition the dura-
tion of the lease upon proper payments of delay rentals.97 Hence,
if a rental is not timely or properly paid, the lease automatically
terminates.
One of the mistakes most frequently made in such a payment is
when the amount payable includes a fraction of a cent. Suppose
the total rental stipulated is $25. Suppose that A owns a 2/3
mineral interest and B a 1/3. It would be a mistake to pay A
$16.67 and B $8.33. This would be an underpayment as to B.
The only practicable way to handle the matter would be to make
an overpayment, paying to A $16.67 and to B $8.34. If
several parties are named as lessors in the same lease, and execute
that lease, problems incident to determining the amount payable
to each can be avoided by depositing the rental to the joint credit
of the lessors in the depository bank designated in the lease.9"
As to when equity should relieve against termination through
a good faith erroneous payment, or a good faith failure to pay,
the theory of ownership may be decisive. It must be remembered
that a forfeiture is not involved; that the lease has by its own
terms terminated. Nevertheless, in jurisdictions holding that the
lease does not vest a title, an analogy to forfeitures is drawn, and
equity will relieve against good faith, excusable mistakes.9 9 In
Texas, which holds that a lease on a usual form vests a determin-
able fee title, it has been held that equity will not relieve unless
97 The history of this provision is traced in Summers, Validity of Oil and Gas
Leases, 34 Yale L. J. 383 (1925).
""Gulf Production Co. v. Perry, 51 S. W. 2d 1107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). When
ownership changes, and the lessee is properly notified thereof, a joint deposit would
be incorrect. The lessors by joining in a single lease in effect agree that rental pay-
ments may be by joint deposit. They do not agree to joint deposits to them and to
a person not a lessor.
91'Gloyd v. Mid-West Refining Co., 62 F. 2d 483 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Browning v.
Weaver. 158 Kan. 255, 146 P. 2d 390 (1944). The authorili.s are collected and dis-
cussed in 2 WALKER, CASES ON 01. AND GAs (1949) 531, 532.
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the lessor is in some way at fault."0 It is submitted that this dif-
ference in theory is not a proper basis for applying different
criteria in determining whether equity should relieve. In either
instance the usual rules incident to equitable relief should control.
If the lessor accepts a late delay rental, this may estop him
from asserting termination."' However, it would be erroneous to
assume that any late acceptance creates an estoppel. For example,
the owner may be able to establish satisfactorily that he accepted
by reason of a good faith mistake. Such acceptance might in some
instances constitute a ratification.
(10) The dry hole clause. Prior to the use of this clause, there
was confusion as to the status of an oil and gas lease where a dry
hole was drilled during the primary term. Did completion of the
dry hole entitle the lessee to hold the lease for the primary term
without payment of rentals? Was it necessary for the lessee to
resume payments, and if so, when? Did the dry hole accelerate
the term and end the lease?"0 2 To cover this situation, this clause
attempts to define specifically the rights of the parties when a dry
hole is drilled. It usually provides that the lease can be held with-
out delay rental payments as long as not more than a designated
period elapses between completion of a dry hole and commence-
ment of another well, and that within a designated period after any
such completion, the delay rental clause shall again become
applicable.
Experience has demonstrated that limiting this clause to dry
holes does not adequately protect the lessee. A similar clause is
necessary when a well capable of producing is completed, but shut
-0,' Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S. W. 2d 355 (1947),
and cases there cited. In this case the lessee made an erroneous payment to a grantee
inder an ambiguous mineral deed.'The payment was enough in advance that the
mineral grantee learned of the mistake in ample time to advise ihe lessee and give
it an opportunity to correct the mistake before the deadline. The grantee was held
estopped to assert termination.
1" Mitchell v. Simms, 63 S. W. 2d 371 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
1,Q See. for example, Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S. W. 304. 255 S. W.
601 (1923) : Whelan v. Shell Oil Co., 212 S. W. 2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref.;
Tennant %. Matthews, 19 S. W. 2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er. ref.; Walker, The
Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 Tex.
L. Rev. 482. 515 (1930) ; 2 SUMMEnS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (Perm. ed. 1938) 266.
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in for lack of a market (in some instances, however, the shut-in
producing in paying quantities ceases so to produce, or ceases pro-
ducing but not in paying quantities, or when a well originally
producing in paying quantities ceases to produce, or ceases pro-
duction entirely. Some recent forms cover all or part of these
contingencies.
Another part of this clause covers the situation where at the
end of the primary term, operations have been commenced but
there is not actual production. Notice that the habendum clause
literally construed requires actual production before the primary
term ends. While there is a conflict of authority, some cases have
so construed it; others have held that when it is considered with
the delay rental clause, commencing the well within the term is
sufficient if this well is later completed as a sufficient producer." 3
It is to avoid this question that an express provision concerning
this matter is now usually inserted. This provision usually covers
also a situation where the well drilling at the expiration of the
primary term is completed as a dry hole or as an insufficient
producer.
(11) Assignment and change of ownership provision.
(a) The right to assign. Either party is given an express right
to assign his interest in whole or in part. Such assignments by the
lessor have been heretofore discussed. An assignee of the lease
as to a part of the land covered thereby is usually given the right
to keep the lease in effect as to that tract by paying delay rentals
in the proportion which said tract bears to the entire acreage.
Under practically all lease forms, actual production upon any part
of the leased premises, if sufficient to continue the lease in effect as
to that part, will continue the lease as to all parts. This follows
from the wording of the habendum clause. For example, assume
that an oil and gas lease is executed covering lots 2 and 3, and that
thereafter the lease as to lot 2 is assigned to Rex. The lease
owner as to lot 3 secures production in paying quantities. This
production, under most forms, continues the lease in effect as to
The Cases arc collected in 2 WALKER, CASFS ON 01. AND (;AS (1949) 488.
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both lots 2 and 3. This factor is important not only with reference
to a contemplated lease, but also in determining whether a prior
lease, not released of record, has terminated.
It is important to distinguish between the owner of a lease as
to a part of the property covered thereby and the owner of an
undivided interest in the entire leasehold. Most leases would not
give the latter owner a right to continue the lease by a payment
based upon his fractional interest. In fact, there is a possible ques-
tion, as yet unanswered by the cases, under the usual wording,
whether he can continue the lease by a full payment, when such
payment is not authorized by the other owners. It is the writer's
opinion that the fractional owner should have this right.""
(b) The change in ownership clause. By this clause it is agreed
that no change in ownership of the lessor's interest, or any part
thereof, shall be binding upon the lessee until the lessee receives
actual notice of the change and certain other specified informa-
tion. This clause is valid and the lessee is entitled to a com-
pliance therewith before there is any duty upon his part to change
his records."' It is surprising how many times persons have pur-
chased valuable mineral interests, and have then neglected to give
proper notice, or, for that matter, any notice to the lessee. Perhaps
the most usual reason for this mistake is the rule that when an
instrument is properly recorded, it serves as notice to the world.
It is important to remember that by most lease forms this rule is
superseded by the express contractual provision under discussion.
(12) The surrender clause. This provision gives the lessee the
option to terminate the lease at any time, as to all or any part of
the leased premises. Some early cases held that the effect of this
was to give a similar option to the lessor, and thus give either party
an option to cancel, at least at any time prior to drilling opera-
tions. These cases overlooked the rule that a unilateral option
104 This, in turn, raises problems with reference to the rights and liabilities of the
owner making the full payment and those not making any payment.
105 Gulf Refining Co. v. Shatford, 159 F. 2d 231 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Cassity v. Smith,
193 S. W. 2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref.
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supported by consideration is valid. The more recent cases uni-
formly apply this latter rule."0 6
The clause is designed to give the lessee the right to terminate
the lease completely, and thus rid himself of all future liability
thereunder, or, if he desires to keep the lease as to part of the
property, to reach the same result as to the unwanted part. The
obligations will be discussed presently. The clause is also used
to reduce the amount of rental payments. There is no obligation
to pay rentals under the usual lease. Payment is simply a condi-
tion upon which the estate is limited. Suppose that a lease covers
1,000 acres. The lessee is interested in continuing the lease as to
only 100 acres. He should release as to the balance, thus reducing
the amount of rentals necessary to hold the lease and limiting his
implied and express covenants to the acreage retained.
One rather hidden point is where some other part of the lease
imposes an express obligation upon the lessee, to be met in the
future, as, for example, an obligation to drill a well within a given
period. If the lease is literally construed, this obligation could be
avoided by releasing under the surrender clause prior to default." 7
(13) The force majeure, or act of God, clause. This clause
simply enumerates conditions beyond the control of lessee which,
unless contracted against, might result in termination or breach
of covenant. It provides in effect that while such a condition exists,
compliance with the provisions affected is excused.
(14) The partial ownership clause. By this provision, if the
lessor owns less than the entire interest, rental and royally pay-
ments are to be reduced proportionately. Frequently, at the time
leases are procured, the exact interests of the varions ownecrs are
unknown, this information being subsequently asccrioincd by title
examination. For this and other reasons, tit! Ivss,, oi ally at-
tempts to have the lease executed without refc,',c.t., 1i iIl; cx'cnt
of ownership. Of course, the lessor's objection is It i lsii wothi
""; For a splendid discussion of this problem, its backgr,, . I Ii v. S,' .r-
mers, l"('idity of Oil and Gas Leases. 34 Yale L. J. 383 ( 1925).
11,7 Guardian Trust Co. v. Brothers, 59 S. W. 2d 343 (T,.x. ki 19:13. I. r. ie.
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constitute breach of warranty. There are at least three possible
answers to this objection: (1) lessor will be paid only on the basis
of his actual interest, and thus there would be no basis for assess-
ing damages against him; (2) there is an unwritten rule in the
industry that the warranty provision will not be enforced in such
an instance; (3) the matter can be covered by limiting the war-
ranty, rather than by placing the fraction in the granting clause.
On the other side of the ledger, the lessor wants the record to
show that there has been no breach. This objection can be met
by limiting the warranty. Further, if the lessor is contracting with
reference to a specific interest, it is important that he contract
against the possibility of thereafter acquiring additional interests
and immediately losing them under the doctrine of after-acquired
title.
In addition to the fact that the lessee may not know the exact
interests, another objection, from his standpoint, to inserting the
fraction in the granting clause, is that it raises the question whether
the partial ownership clause refers to a full interest in the frac-
tion stated or to a full interest in the land described. 08
The best procedure from an impartial standpoint is to make
the reference to the fraction a part of the warranty clause, with an
express negation of the possibility of the application of the doc-
trine of after-acquired title. A situation which the usual partial
ownership clause may not cover is when the lease provides for
payments not strictly delay rentals or royalty-as, for example, an
oil payment, or a bonus. If it is desired to have this provision
apply to one or more of these payments, there should be an express
provision to that effect.
The importance of this partial ownership clause from the les-
see's standpoint cannot be overly stressed. Suppose, for example,
a lease is accepted from the owner of a 1/32 interest. The lessee
in the event of production and absent such clause would then be
required to pay the entire stipulated royalty to such owner. Thus,
108 See text at note 72, supra.
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if the lease provided for a one-eighth royalty, this is what the
lessee would have agreed to pay. Whereas, if the partial ownership
clause had been used, the payment would be 1/32 of 1/8, which is
usually what the parties actually intended should be paid.
(15) Summary of the principal conditions which will terminate
a lease automatically, unless the lease is being held by compliance
with one or more of the other conditions therein.
(a) Failure to pay delay rentals.
(b) Failure to have production, as that term is used in the
habendum clause.
(c) Failure to pay shut-in royalties at a time when the lease is
in effect. "'
(16) Implied covenants. The trend is toward implying as one
covenant, that the lessee will act as would a reasonable and prudent
operator, except insofar as such action is expressly negatived by
.the lease.
The two usual covenants referred to and which have frequently
resulted in litigation are the covenants to reasonably develop and
the covenant to offset. These covenants are easily defined although
frequently difficult to apply. The numerous cases which have dealt
with them were chiefly concerned with whether there had been a
breach and, if so, what the measure of recovery should be.
The covenant of reasonable development simply requires that
lessee drill at least as many wells and produce therefrom as would
a reasonable and prudent operator. The covenant to offset is based
upon drainage. If under the law of capture, wells are legitimately
draining oil from Lot 6, it is but reasonable to require that the
lessee counteract such drainage by drilling on Lot 6, provided a
prolitable well can be drilled.
, Anollwr condition mentioned in earlier cases is ahandonrnnt of the lease by
lesee. As Iis condiion could rarely if ever occlor under moeIrn formis, it dccrves
no mor- tian passing nentmion. Sie rxas Co. v. Davis, cited supra nolo 102. Abaodon-
ment as a condition should be distinguished from abandonment as a groond for for-
feit tre. her inafter disciissed. It should also be distingih.d [rom an intentional
reliIulishonvout of litle. Sue Ml|ERtI.., COVENANTS IMN11II') IN (I , ANi (GAS I,EASI.'; (2d
ed. 1940) § 8. Logically, this type of abandonment could liv, tbosuil.I, only in states
treating iIe interest of the lessee as in tIre nutuire of prsathy.
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Problems which will likely give rise to added covenants occur
when because of governmental regulations, wells cannot be drilled
on Lot 6. How far must the lessee go in seeking to meet this situa-
tion by securing voluntary pooling agreements, or, in a state
authorizing involuntary pooling, in procuring such pooling? It
is believed that here again the test is simple, i.e., what would a
reasonable and prudent operator do? However, as with the other
covenants mentioned, it frequently will be difficult to determine
whether there has been a breach.
Granted a breach of an implied or express covenant, what
should be lessor's remedy? In qualified ownership cases such
breach at first was treated as an abandonment which authorized
forfeiture of the lease. In earlier cases the opinions sometimes did
not clearly distinguish between an intentional abandonment of
title, which, if possible under the theory applicable to a lessee's
interest in a given jurisdiction would have resulted in automatic
termination,"' and abandonment which is relied upon as a breach
110 See note 109.
of covenant. Here there would not be automatic termination.
Rather, the lessor would have to secure a decree forfeiting the
lease.
In many early cases, particularly in states applying the quali-
fied ownership doctrine, forfeiture was both requested and granted.
The present trend, however, is to limit the lessor to damages, or
to render an alternative decree, fixing past damages and requiring
the lessee either to comply with the covenant within a stipulated
time or to submit to forfeiture.'
It is important for the lessee to keep in mind that many times
the surrender clause, above discussed, can be used to avoid breach-
ing one or more express or implied covenants.
11 A detailed analysis of the problems here involved is not within the scope of this
article. For further analyses, the reader is referred to Waggoner Estate v. Si,er Oil
Co., 118 Tex. 509. 19 S. W. 2d 27 (1929); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v.
Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 120 P. 2d 349, 138 A. L. 1R. 246 (1941), and vases there
cited; Notes, 19 A. L. R. 437 (1922) and 60 A. L. R. 950 (1929) ; ME RILL. COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AN!) G.s LEASES (2d ed. 1940) §§ 93-117: 2 SLuxiMiEis. Oi. AN!) CAS
(Perm. ed. 1938) § 398 et seq.; Walker, Express Clauses in Oil and Gas Lease.i A fect-
ing the Usual Implied Obligations of the Lessee, 13 Miss. L. J. 292 1941).
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